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Summary 
This article analyzes construction of post-ethnic collective identity in the 2014-2016 Macedonian 
social movements. Instead of looking at the large-scale political changes as a yard stick for a success 
or a failure of a social movement, it focuses on the cognitive process of collective identity and social 
action, whereby heterogeneous individuals come together as a collective entity, learn to understand 
their grievances in collective terms, and nurture a new sense of group-identity in relation to the 
external environment. It sees that this process itself – based on shared memories of collective 
struggle for the common interest against the common enemy – shall be understood as a fruitful 
outcome of a social movement that generates new movement biographies for sustainable and 
permanent ‘we-ness’. In the light of Bernd Simon and Bert Klandermans’ ‘tripod approach’ to 
collective identity, it furthermore argues that the success of a long-lasting social movement lies on 
making of politically relevant collective identity that appeals to social bystanders in the general 
public, and that this inclusive and societal context beyond the ethno-nationalist rhetoric was a 
driving force behind the real success of the 2014-2016 movements.  
Introduction 
After Talat Xhaferi, an ethnic Albanian politician, was appointed as the new speaker of the 
Macedonian parliament in April 2017, around 200 supporters of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization, VMRO-DPMNE, stormed the parliament and attacked journalists and several members 
of Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, SDSM, including now the Prime Minister of Macedonia, 
Zoran Zaev. An angry mob sang Macedonian national songs and waved Macedonian flags, while Zaev, 
blood pouring from his forehead, and 102 other injured Members of Parliament had to be evacuated 
by the police rescue squad. This shocking brawl came after months of timid coalition talks between 
Zaev and his Albanian partners, and after the President’s, Gjorge Ivanov, refusal to hand Zaev the 
mandate. The same time last year, the deep political division was still there – yet, the situation was 
different. In April 2016, the student protests that began two years earlier grew into a full-blown 
nation-wide movement against rampant clientelism and corruption under then the Prime Minister, 
Nikola Gruevski, and, for the first time in a decade, Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE – despite a narrow 
election win – failed to form a new coalition and was eventually overthrown in December 2016. The 
ongoing scandal, however, evidences the persistent social and political instability in the country, and 
its yet-superficial democracy that continues to shape Macedonia’s political scene. As one NGO worker 
said in an interview, ‘some of the political elites in the country, including the former ruling party, are 
only deepening the gaps between the people, instead of working to bridge them together’2. Despite 
the two-year-long struggle against authoritarian populism, the chronical ills of post-socialist 
Macedonian society seem to have yet been defeated. It is true that, as some write34, the political 
                                                          
1 Article forthcoming on Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, 57(4): 41-53.  
2 Aleksander Dimishkovski, “Macedonia has new government, but rocky road ahead”, New York Times, June 1, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/macedonia-zoran-zaev-election.html (accessed June 25, 2017). 
3 Dimitar Bechev, “What is happening in Macedonia?”, Al Jazeera, April 30, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/04/happening-macedonia-170430135004624.html (accessed June 
01, 2017). 
4 Paul Reef, “Macedonia’s Colorful Revolution and the Election of 2016. A Change for Democracy, or All for Nothing?”, 
Südosteuropa 65, no. 1 (2017). 
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schisms that had pervaded Macedonian society for years nevertheless continue. What was then the 
two-year-long struggle against authoritarian populism all for? The same problem is said to 
continuously jeopardize the country’s democratic development: Were the 2014-2016 movements 
really all for nothing?        
 This article addresses the 2014-2016 Macedonian social movements as a cognitive process, 
wherein individuals with diverse backgrounds learned to understand themselves as a collective 
entity with shared grievances towards social and political injustice. Instead of looking at macro-level 
political outcomes as a yardstick for a success or a failure of a social movement, it focuses on the 
process of a coming-together among heterogenous members of society who construct self-awareness 
as an in-group in a power struggle with a political out-group. Understanding a social movement 
through the lens of collective identity is especially important in the Macedonian context, because the 
success of the 2014-2016 social movements – and I will detail this further later – lied on construction 
of inclusive group-ness as a unified social actor beyond the social and political divisions that had been 
the dominant feature of much short-lived earlier movements. What follows below is the story of the 
new sense of collective identity in post-socialist Macedonia beyond the ethno-nationalist rhetoric, 
that of shared experience of a struggle against the decade-long reign of authoritarian populism, and 
that of new movement biographies that made an example of a sustainable social movement for 
generations to come.  
Making of ‘We’ in Social Movement 
In contrast to more commonly reflected tradition of social movement scholarship, social psychology 
of protest is much more concerned with the social sense of the identity component, as Bert 
Klandermans and Marga de Weerd write: ‘by taking group membership as a constituent of identity’5. 
Conversely, the acquisition of a collective ‘we’ in the vein of social movement literature – being able 
to act, believe, or identify collectively – is a learning process, wherein one actively learns to associate 
oneself with an in-group and its members that eventually leads to ‘acting-together’ that we can refer 
to as a social movement. This arises, as Taylor and Whittier67 write, from a set of in-group definitions 
that reflect the collective interests, and is maintained by interactions between its members and their 
politicized-valorized consciousness – a consciousness that otherwise remains politically neutral8. 
Construction of collectiveness in the context of a social protest, therefore, is highly dependent on a 
shared experience, and, in specific, with social injustice – be it corruption, housing problem, police 
brutality, or high unemployment, which potential in-group members can raise shared awareness 
against and respond to, and, therefore, being able to give politicized meanings to their group-identity 
and thereafter-following social movements. A shared experience is an important one here, because 
it is this collective understanding of social injustice that allows people to stand up against their 
opponents and it is this reciprocity that makes their collective identity and action politically 
meaningful and significant. This can be most observed in movements, whose members mobilize 
around issues dealing with shared experiences of an often-broader population, e.g. peace protests 
following terrorist attacks in London, Paris, and Manchester in 2016 and 2017. 
On the other hand, social psychological interest over collective identities and actions lies on 
the issue of the structural influences of in- and out-group boundaries followed by self-categorization 
                                                          
5 Bert Klandermans and Marga de Weerd, “Group Identification and Political Protest”, in Self, Identity, and Social 
Movements, ed. Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J Owens and Robert W White, 69-92, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000, 68. 
6 Verata Taylor and Nancy E Whittier, “Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist 
Mobilization”, in Frontiers of Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D Moris and Carol M Mueller, 104-130, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992. 
7 Verata Taylor and Nancy E Whittier, “Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of Women’s 
Movement”, in Social Movements and Culture, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, 163-187, Minneapolis/London: 
University of Minnesota Press/UCL Press, 1995. 
8 Klandermans and de Weerd, “Group Identification and Political Protest”. 
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and -comparison91011. A social identity arises through a cognitive process, wherein one consciously 
categorizes oneself with an in-group in opposition to an out-group based on contrasting evaluations, 
which, in result, works to enhance one’s self-esteem. In other words, this is a process, where an 
individual becomes a part of a category, i.e. deindividualization, by accentuating the supposed 
similarities between self and a positively-weighted in-group and the differences with a negatively-
weighted out-group. Beyond the psychology of in- and out-group formation, social identity theory’s 
elucidation on identity management – status- and mobility-management of an inferior group and 
their members – sheds light on how people with a negatively-perceived social group strengthens 
their in-group identity to raise a collective voice to alter their status. Here, collective actions to better 
the inferior status in regards to their out-group counterparts depends on, first, the stability of their 
in-group status, and, second, the permeability of the group-boundaries. Put differently, members of 
a negatively-perceived in-group can strengthen their group-identity to act collectively to change their 
situation, if their status is seen illegitimate and, if their intra-group relations are stable enough to 
carry out such actions. Cases, where protesters mobilize around their unjust situation that they share 
as a group, e.g. student protests across Austria and Germany against the ‘Bologna Process’ in 2009, 
exemplify the capability of and preference for collective actions taken by in-group members followed 
by group-identification. It should be noted here that group-identification, which potential in-group 
members make, does not simply derive from their primordial qualifications, e.g. ethnicity, gender, 
race, or religion, but rather from a self-made and voluntary alignment, for which membership allows 
heterogeneous individuals to politicize their collective-identity and -actions12. 
Construction of collective identity in the light of social movement literature refers to the kind 
of process that a group collectively engages in, of which outcome reflects the cultural production of 
collective consciousness, as opposed to the social psychological process of individual efforts that are 
made in the context of deindividualization and self-categorization based on membership13. Taking 
the important notes on pursuit of collective identity and social movement into account, the 
remainder of the article sheds light on the social movements in Macedonia’s escalating political crisis 
since 2014. Construction of collective identity in the context of Macedonian protests tells us a unique 
story of transformation of ‘who-we-are’ as a political strategy to appeal to the broader public, to reify 
the shared experience of social injustice as grounds for mobilization, and, most importantly, to unite 
people beyond social and political divisions, which had been an underlying characteristic of the 
earlier social movements in post-socialist Macedonia.  
Where It All Began… 
The tale of post-socialist Macedonian social movements begins with the limited successes that 
Macedonia enjoyed following its transition into liberal democracy. Unlike their counterparts in 
Central and Eastern Europe, whose economic liberalization and integration into global market 
legitimized the ‘hegemony of the new order’14, the political elites of post-socialist Macedonia had 
benefited from the lack of security amid both regional, e.g. 2001 insurgency, and international crises, 
e.g. 1995 naming dispute with Greece. In the aftermath of 2001 Albanian insurgency and the 
legislative election in the following year, a new coalition government was formed between SDSM and 
                                                          
9 Michael A Hogg et al.,” A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory”, 
Social Psychological Quarterly 58, no. 4 (1995). 
10 Jan E Stets and Peter J Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory”, Social Psychological Quarterly 63, no. 3 
(2000). 
11 Henri Tajfel et al., “The Social Dimension in European Social Psychology”, in The Social Dimension: European 
Developments in Social Psychology, ed. Henri Tajfel, 1-5, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.  
12 Klandermands and de Weerd, “Group Identification and Political Protest”. 
13 This is the difference between the social construction of collective beliefs at a group-level and their appropriation at an 
individual-level. 
14 Ljupcho Petkovski and Ditmar Nikolovski, “Populism and Progressive Social Movements in Macedonia”, Czech Journal of 
Political Science 2, (2016). 
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Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, and this marked a new era for Macedonian politics with 
increasing ethnic nationalism from the opposition and diminishing trust in neo-liberal politics among 
ethnic Macedonians. The limited political and economic success that the country saw under the reign 
of SDSM and BDI paved a way for the rise of an authoritarian, nationalist, and anti-elitist opposition 
leader, namely Nikola Gruevski, in 2006, whose anti-liberal and -pluralist politics strongly revolved 
around making of the ‘real people’ – the victims of pro-Albanian and -European liberal elites. 
Authoritarian populism led by Gruevski and his VMRO-DPMNE had largely benefited from a deep 
popular dissatisfaction with the exclusive and non-transparent multiethnic coalition between SDSM 
and BDI, whose autocratic decision-making style had met with strong criticisms from domestic to 
international NGOs, from local to central authorities, and from ethnic Macedonians to populist 
politicians, who had successfully politicized democratic deficits of post-socialist Macedonia into an 
ethnic problem. In the increasing ethnic tension in the post-Ohrid Framework Agreement15 regime – 
fueled by high unemployment rate; low wages; ever-worsening domestic economy; corruption and 
crime, the self-proclaimed ‘true defender of the nation’ had finally won its battle against the 
‘betrayers’ of Macedonian people in 2006 Parliamentary Election1617.  
 Electoral success of Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE in 2006 is not dissimilar from the rise of 
populism witnessed elsewhere in post-socialist Europe. In Macedonia too, construction of the new 
‘we’ and ‘others’ strongly centered around populists’ accusation on liberal and social-democrat – or 
former communist –  political elite, accompanied by delegitimization of democratic and liberal 
institutions in the name of the ‘real people’. Much like other post-socialist countries, e.g. Fidesz’s 
success in 2002 Hungarian Parliamentary Election; or 2005 electoral victory of PiS, Law and Justice, 
in Poland, the ‘real people’ of Macedonia – with support of Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE –  responded 
to the failing ‘liberal’ government. Making of the ‘real people’ in Macedonian context, however, had a 
strong ethic flair. Because the long-standing ethnic division between Albanian and Macedonians was 
left un- and mistreated under the previous government, a number of interethnic resolutions 
proposed by the SDSM and BDI coalition, e.g. controversial 2004 Law on Territorial Organization18, 
dismayed much of ethnic Macedonian voters. Mass protests in July 2004, exemplify the birth of a new 
collective identity amid mounting discontents among Macedonians anchored in their shared 
experience with increasing social instability under the previous government; in monoethnic 
solidarity fueled by radical nationalist rhetoric of populist politicians; and in successful politicization 
of their ‘difference’ with pro-Albanian and -European elite ‘others’. With thereafter-followed election 
victory of VMRO-DPMNE in 2006, anti-pluralist and -liberal politics prospered, defamation of the 
political opposition intensified, and, consequently, the schism between the ‘real people’ and ‘others’ 
that its political legitimacy had dependent on had widened19.  
Fragmented ‘We’ in Earlier Movements against Authoritarian Populism 
Making of the ‘real people’ has consistently been a driving force behind the authoritarian politics of 
Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE, since 2006. It won’t be an overstatement to say that nationalist rhetoric 
of the ‘we-and-others’ binary in their decade-long reign was of utmost importance, as the political 
legitimacy of Macedonian populism had always been deeply rooted in its ‘struggle’ against the so-
                                                          
15 In the aftermath of 2001 Albanian Insurgency, both ethnic Albanian and Macedonian political parties agreed on 
implementation of multiethnic policies across the nation. These included constitutional amendments for the veto rights 
for Albanian communities in some of major policy areas, e.g. education, finance, language, and local politics among others. 
16 Jovan Ananiev, “Factors for Strengthening of the Right-Oriented Parties in Macedonia”, Balkan Social Science Review, no. 
1, (2013). 
17 Kamelia R Dimitrova, “Municipal Decisions on the Border of Collapse: Macedonian Decentralization and the Challenges 
of Post-Ohrid Democracy”, Southern European Politics 5, no. 2-3, (2004). 
18 The law proposed a re-organization of local municipalities that eventually gave ethnic Albanians greater autonomy in 
the areas with larger Albanian populations. 
19 Ljupcho Petkovski, “Authoritarian Populism and Hegemony: Constructing ‘the People’ in Macedonia’s illiberal 
discourse. Contemporary Southeastern Europe 3, no. 2, (2015). 
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called ‘transitional elite’ 20 . Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE’s obsession with construction and 
maintenance of the ‘real people’ is perhaps best-exemplified in their trademark project, Skopje 201421, 
as well as in the protests that had taken place following its proposal in 2009. When the government 
first announced the initial proposal for an urban re-generation project in the city center of Skopje, a 
group of architecture students, First Archi Brigade, from Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje 
organized sporadic demonstrations – although these loosely organized protests were met only with 
a minor success. Engineering a coherent collective-history-narrative for the ‘real people’ of 
Macedonia through a kitschy urban beautification project was opposed mainly from architects, 
students, and local authorities whose organization, however, remained yet peripheral and failed to 
draw attention of the broader public22 . A collective voice that the First Archi Brigade and Co. sought 
to establish against Skopje 2014 – to the authoritarian nature of Gruevki’s policy-making to a larger 
extent – was fragile, e.g. loose organization through social media, and fragmented, e.g. exclusive 
criteria for in-group members, to expand the shared definition for an in-group to the wider 
population – hence, limited shared experience of and solidarity against social injustice. In spite of 
their appeal to the ‘citizens’ to ‘wake up, for once with their own heads, and become actors in the 
building…their city’s future instead of remaining merely passive observers’ 23 , lack of cognitive 
definitions of a shared experience of social injustice among ordinary Macedonians was evident in a 
number of the counter-protests that followed soon after. This is crucial, because, for potential in-
group members with diverse qualifications to come to see themselves as a collective entity, they need 
to correspondingly establish a sense of ‘we-ness’ ‘within a language that is…specific to the group’24 
in relation to the environment, and the social and political ‘others’. Construction of collective identity 
in a social movement, therefore, is a process, wherein a diverse bunch of social actors come together 
and learn themselves as unified subjects. The relationship between collective identity and a social 
movement is then a symbiotic one, because, as the movement progresses, the collective identity 
matures, and, in turn, as the collective identity strengthens, it defines the ‘continuity and permanence 
of the movement over time’25. The spirit of 2009 student protest short-lived, and its anti-populist 
narrative failed to appeal to the more conservative, religious, and yet-deeply-divided ethnic 
communities of Macedonia. What initially began as a protest against the autocratic decision-making 
process of populist politics again reaffirmed the deep schism between the ‘real people’ and the 
‘others’, as the counter- and protests became a mere proxy war between the governing VMRO-DPMNE 
and the opposition parties26. A failure to re-negotiate the ‘collective’ in relation to concrete ‘others’ 
makes any further collective action impossible 27 , and this was too strongly featured in other 
Macedonian social movements prior to 2014. 
 The beating of – and the eventual killing of – Martin Neskovski in June 2011 and the 
thereafter-followed protests against police brutality is another example of the failed management of 
a sustainable collective identity in earlier Macedonian social movements. To the public uproar over 
the death of Neskovski, who was beaten to death by Macedonian special police taskforce, Tiger, at the 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 A highly controversial urban renewal project that was designed to give the city of Skopje a more neo-classical image. 
Macedonian government was heavily criticized for spending up to 560 billion Euros on construction of historicist 
buildings, monuments, and sculptures – in spite of more than 30% unemployment rate at the. Between 2012 and 2014, 
around 20 administrative buildings, concert halls, and museums were constructed and over 40 monuments were erected 
across the city center.  
22 Ljupcho Petkovski and Dimitar Nikolovski, “Populism and Progressive Social Movements in Macedonia”. 
23 Elena Ignatova, “Macedonia: Student Protest Ends in Violence”, Global Voices, March 31, 2009, 
https://globalvoices.org/2009/03/31/macedonia-student-protest-ends-in-violence (accessed May 18, 2017).  
24 Ibid., 44. 
25 Ibid., 49. 
26 Sinisa J Marusic, “Construction of Controversial Skopje Church Begins”, Balkan Insights, June 07, 2012, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/construction-of-controversial-skopje-church-begins (accessed May 20, 2017). 
27 Alberto Melucci, “The Process of Collective Identity”. 
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celebration of VMRO-DPMNE’s 2011 election victory28, the central authorities remained silent29. The 
story of Neskovski quickly spread on social media and the largest demonstration ever-seen in post-
socialist Macedonia took place30. Despite the relatively well-defined collective grievances against 
police brutality, the protests of 2011 summer remained yet insufficient to challenge the authorities, 
and the voice against the populist regime showed lack of a political context and relevance. The failure 
to turn their voice into a politically relevant one, in turn, made the protesters difficult to clearly define, 
first, the concrete ‘we’ and ‘they’ that correspond to the conflictual in-group-out-group dynamics, 
second, the causality between the ‘others’ and the injustice ‘we’ face, and, third, lack of self-conscious 
engagement in a well-defined political struggle on behalf of their in-group and against their political 
out-group313233. Although the encounter with an authoritarian out-group who held responsible for 
social injustice paved a way for mass protests, lack of politicized group-awareness failed to expand 
the boundary of its in-group for the broader public, and their vague political orientation in progress 
failed to challenge the schism between the ‘real people’ and ‘others’ instigated by the populist 
rhetoric. In a constructivist approach34353637, collective identity of a social movement is a cultural and 
social construct, and, therefore, it implies a coming-together of heterogenous individuals as an in-
group in accordance with the trajectory of a movement itself. It is then a process, as Alberto 
Melucci3839 writes, wherein individuals who are loosely connected through the yet-politicized ‘we-
and-other’ binary learn to see themselves as a more-organized and -institutionalized collective entity. 
Collective identity, therefore, is the ‘ability of a collective actor to reorganize the effects of its actions 
and to attribute these effects to itself’, and a lack of this particular ability was perhaps a decisive 
factor for the unsustainability of earlier social movements in Macedonia, and for the simultaneous 
failure of constructing a more inclusive politicized in-group beyond the populist rhetoric of the ‘real 
people’ of Macedonia.             
Politicized Collective Identity beyond Ethnic Schism in the 2014-2016 Movements 
The relational dimension of collective identity highlights the interaction between movement actors, 
who actively produce shared meanings as the movement progresses, whose ability to reflect their 
shared experience in collective terms appropriates the outcomes of their actions, and who learn to 
differentiate themselves from ‘others’ while continuing to be ‘us’. From this constructivist 
perspective, collective identity is not a mere reaction of a naturally-given population to the 
environment, but a process, wherein the movement actors must learn to identify themselves as a 
collective entity in a clear dis-identification with the external environment40 . Collective identity, 
therefore, is generated by a coming-together of diverse individuals as an in-group who builds ‘shared 
                                                          
28 In June, 2011, Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE had won their 3rd consecutive victory in the parliamentary elections. 
29 Sinisa J Marusic, “Macedonia Protest over ‘Fatal Police Beating’, Balkan Insights, May 12, 2011, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonians-protest-after-police-murders-youngster (accessed June 3, 2017) 
30 Ljupcho Petkovski and Dimitar Nikolovski, “Populism and Progressive Social Movements in Macedonia”. 
31 William A Gamson, Taking Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. 
32 Bert Klandermans and Marga de Weerd, “Group Identification and Political Protest”. 
33 Bernd Simon and Bert Klandermans, “Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Psychological Analysis”, American 
Psychologist 56, no. 4, (2001). 
34 Cristina F Fominaya, “Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates”, Sociology Compass 4, no. 
6 (2010). 
35 Bert Klandermans and Marga de Weerd, “Group Identification and Political Protest”. 
36 Alberto Melucci, “The Process of Collective Identity”. 
37 Francesca Polletta and James M Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements”, Annual Review of Sociology 37, 
(2001). 
38 Alberto Melucci, “The Process of Collective Identity”. 
39 Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age, Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1996. 
40 This is what Alberto Melucci calls a processual approach to collective identity, wherein in-group members learn to 
respond to the external social world by redefinition and reconstruction of their actions that correspond to new social and 
political orientations over the course of their phased development. 
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memories’ 41  through a shared history of protest-participation, of which outcome – ‘movement 
identity’42 – is central to its sustainability and permanence. Sustainable collective identity requires, 
however, more than just an ‘interactive and shared definition…concerned with the orientation of 
action and field of opportunities and constraints…’43. The failures of 2009 and 2011 demonstrations 
against an urban beautification project and police brutality did not derive from lack of strong 
interaction between in-group members per se, but, rather, from lack of political relevance in their 
collective voice that could mobilize actors in a self-conscious political struggle of the broader public. 
This inclusive context is an important one, because political struggles mostly involve ‘third parties’ 
aside from those who are immediately involved in a conflict. This more inclusive and societal context 
is what Bernd Simon and Klandersmans (2001) call a ‘tripod approach’ that sees the in- and out-
group boundaries to be more fluid and flexible, because inclusion of the broader public itself acts as 
a strategy to claim the legitimacy of a social movement against the discredited authorities. For 
sustainable collective identity for a long-standing social movement, the inclusive and societal context 
of a power struggle is of utmost importance for the in-group members to engage in a self-conscious 
action, where their collective voice speaks for the interest of the broader public.  
 Following the fourth election victory of Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE, the general repertoire 
of anti-authoritarianism dominated the protest scene of mid-2014. The opposition leaders, namely 
Zoran Zaev in SDSM accused Gruevski of election fraud, and, in return, the four-time Prime Minister 
condemned his political rivals for working behind the ‘real people’ who, as a senior member of VMRO-
DPMNE said in an interview, ‘did not allow to be taken in by the manipulative scenarios from the 
opposition’44. The power game between VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, as well as the soon-after followed 
protests, didn’t differ much from the long-standing turmoil that had pervaded Macedonia’s political 
scene in the last decade, and its discourse seemed insufficient to diverge from the populist rhetoric 
of the ‘real people’ and the pro-Western and –EU ‘transitional elites’. After the government’s decision 
to introduce a state-sponsored exam across universities in late 2014, however, social movements in 
Macedonia took a different turn. A series of authoritarian reforms in the education sector not only 
fueled mass demonstrations by the students and professors, but, this time, their grievances against 
the ruling party were able to reflect a deep dissatisfaction with the decade-long reign of Gruevski and 
VMRO-DPMNE shared by the wider public. This shared awareness of grievances is a particularly 
important one, because collectively-defined grievances against social and political injustice can 
transform ‘my/your’ predicament into ‘ours’, e.g. wide-spread political oppression, because ‘our’ 
unjust predicament as an in-group becomes a driving force behind a struggle against a ‘common’ 
enemy, e.g. authorities, and because then the actors in this confrontation with a well-defined political 
out-group can appeal to the public-at-large as a part of society, e.g. a nation-wide movement identity 
and an eventual overthrow of the ruling elites. The more inclusive and societal context of the 2014-
2016 student movements was strongly featured in their multiethnic outlook. In contrast to the vivid 
ethnic flair in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s student movements45, the cross-ethnic mobilization of 
post-2014 protests meant a successful deviation from the hitherto-prevalent ethnic division between 
Macedonians and Albanians for more inclusive collective identity upon shared experiences of social 
and political injustice. The departure from the ethnic scope to a broader and more inclusive 
movement paved a road for a coming-together of the fragmented voices in deep social and political 
divisions of post-socialist Macedonia, and its inclusive and societal context redefined the struggle 
against authoritarianism in collective terms that concerned the common interest of Macedonian 
                                                          
41 Cristina F Fominaya, “Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates”, 398. 
42 William A Gamson, Commitment and Agency in Social Movements, Sociological Forum 6, no. 1, 1991. 
43 Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. 
44 Kole Casule, “Macedonian opposition cries election foul, will not accept results”, Reuters, April 27, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/amp/idUKBREA3POL820140427 (accessed June 1, 2017) 
 
45 Lura Pollozhani, “The Student Movement in Macedonia 2014-2016”, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen no. 5-6, 2016. 
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society-at-large. The new sense of ‘post-ethnic’ solidarity diverged from the schism between the ‘we-
and-others’ binary in populist rhetoric, whereby the protesters and the public came to understand 
the movement as a cross-ethnic and –political struggle. This was an invitation for ‘social bystanders’, 
third party46 , to a new form of self-consciousness for a collective struggle, which nurtured the 
politicization of collective movement identity – a prerequisite for a sustainable social movement47. 
‘Enough Silence!’48, Dosta bese molk, was no more an outcry of just university students against the 
authoritarian education reforms, but that of shared grievances in civil society against the oppressive 
political regime that had impeded Macedonia’s democratic development. Another important aspect 
to be credited for the success of cross-ethnic and –political mobilization of the 2014-2016 student 
movement came not only from the protesters, but their political opponents. Once mass 
demonstrations began after the proposal of state-sponsored university exams, Gruevski’s cabinet not 
only failed to respond to the protesters’ demands, but continued to pursue a number of other 
controversial policies, including higher ex gratia payment tax imposition and the faux-baroque 
beautification project in the capital city, Skopje 2014. This was a crucial factor for successful 
mobilization of a much wider in-group, wherein the actors across different movements, e.g. contract 
workers movement in 2015 49 ; and ‘I love GTC’ movement against demolishment of City Trade 
Center50, could come together as a collective body against the common enemy beyond issue-based 
organization. The success the 2014-2016 student movement made epitomizes the significance of 
politicized collective identity for sustainability and permanence of a social movement. As their 
grievances were shared by the general public, their struggle became a struggle for the common 
interest of civil society. As their struggle became ‘our’ struggle against the oppressive authorities, it 
became a movement of society-at-large, whose members developed a mutual group-identity beyond 
the ethnic, gender, or religious divisions that had hitherto dominated its political scene. Then there 
was sustainable collective identity born, and this served as a prelude to the thereafter-followed ‘I 
Protest’, Protestiram, and ‘Colorful Revolution’, Sarena Revolucija – nation-wide movements against 
Skopje 2014, which saw the eventual overthrow of the VMRO-DPMNE – DUI coalition in 2016 
Parliamentary Election51.               
In Conclusion – What was It All for? 
After months of relentless coalition talks, as well as a series of ‘tough talks’ from European Union and 
NATO, Zaev’s SDSM formed a new government with his Albanian coalition partners in May 2017. The 
story of the 2014-2016 student movements that finally brought an end to the decade-long reign of 
Gruevski, however, is far from complete, as the ‘guardian of the real people’ – despite abuses of power, 
wide-spread corruption, rife nepotism and among many other – still maintains a narrow 
parliamentary majority. It is true that the deep division between political parties nevertheless 
continues to pervade Macedonia. It is also true that populist rhetoric of the ‘real people’ and the pro-
Albanian and –EU ‘transitional elite’ is after all still rampant in its political scene. Storming of the 
parliament by angry VMRO-DPMNE supporters in April 2017 evidences that the long-standing 
divisions in Macedonian politics yet live and that the defeat of authoritarian populism may not come 
                                                          
46 Bernd Simon and Bert Klandermans, “Politicized Collective Identity: A Sociological Analysis”. 
47 Verata Tayler and Nancy E Whittier, “Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of the Women’s 
Movement”. 
48 As it was in the earlier protests in the early 2010s, ‘enough silence’ was a popular protest slogan in the 2014 student 
movement that criticized both the oppressive – and unresponsive – Gruevski’s regime and the non-political stance taken 
in the previous movements.  
49 Sinisa J Marusic, “Macedonia Contract Workers Protest Tax Increase”, Balkan Insights, December 22, 2014, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-contract-workers-protest-tax-increase (accessed June 11, 2017). 
50 Goran Janev, “Skopje 2014: Erasing Memories, Building History”, in Balkan Heritages: Negotiating History and Culture, 
ed. Maria Couroucli and Tchavdar Marinov, 111-130, Farnham: Ashgate. 
51 Albeit the narrow election win, Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE had failed to form a new coalition with his Albanian partners, 
and, for the first time in more than a decade, a new government led by SDSM under Zaev was formed in May 2017. 
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as soon as anticipated by the protesters. The real success of the 2014-2016 student movements, 
however, lies on the shared experience of a coming-together as a unified actor against social and 
political injustice, not much so on the macro-level outcomes that alter the politics-at-large. In contrast 
to their predecessors, the protesters of the 2014-2016 student movements learned to understand 
their grievances towards authoritarian populism in collective terms, came together as a unified entity 
for a collective struggle against the unjust authorities, and, more importantly, managed to work out 
a movement identity beyond the ethnicity-based group-membership that had dominated the 
previous movements. The success of the 2014-2016 student movements – in fact, that of any other 
social movement against social and political injustice – shall not only be measured by the ostensible 
large-scale political changes, but by the new sense of collective identity that brought cultural impacts 
to civil society, that produced new movement biographies not only of direct participants but of the 
wider public, and that made an example of a successful social movement for future generations.     
 Authoritarian populism pervades, not only this small landlocked former Yugoslavian republic, 
but across Eastern and Southeast Europe. The causes behind this phenomenon differ from case to 
case, and so do their trajectories, as well as their social and political outcomes. The tale of Macedonian 
social movements, however, provides us an important lens through which we can look at the varying 
degrees of success and failure of social movements in the region we had witnessed over the years. 
How does a social movement successfully generate collective identity? How can protesters maintain 
a sustainable movement that speaks for the common interest of ‘social bystanders’? Why does the 
inclusive and societal context matter for the sustainability and permanence of a social movement? 
Protests against authoritarian populism are not new in Eastern and Southeast Europe. As the 2016 
protests against media oppression under PiS in Poland or more recent protests in Serbia over the 
alleged election fraud of Alexander Vučić exemplify, young protesters and ‘liberal’ politicians in the 
region do not remain silent in the face of social and political injustice. Their failures to generate a 
long-lasting social movement and appeal to society-at-large, however, make one thing clear: without 
shared awareness of grievances against the common ‘enemy’, and without a collective identity with 
political relevance that speaks for the ‘silent majority’52, a movement is left peripheral, its grievances 
fail to become ‘our’ predicament, and, as result, it remains insufficient to win its power struggle 
against the authoritarian populist authorities.      
 
                                                          
52 Gabriel Mugny, The Power of Minorities, London: Academic Press. 
